Cyclical choice is persistently observed in experimental evidence. It typically occurs in simple decision problems (involving only binary comparisons and few alternatives) and in significant proportions, sometimes nearing or even exceeding 50 percent. This is obviously incompatible with the classical model of ratio nal choice, in which choice is constructed as the maximizer of a single preference relation (which we call a rationale), or of a utility function. If a decision maker exhibits cycles of choice over some set of alternatives, for any candidate "best" alternative there is always another one in the set that is judged better still: it is not possible to express a decision maker's preferences by a utility function, since it is not possible to find See, e.g., Amos Tversky (969) , Graham Loomes, Chris Starmer, and Robert Sugden (99) , and Peter H. M. P. Roelofsma and Daniel Read (2000) . Roelofsma and Read 
Sequentially Rationalizable Choice
By Paola Manzini and Marco Mariotti* A sequentially rationalizable choice function is a choice function that can be retrieved by applying sequentially to each choice problem the same fixed set of asymmetric binary relations (rationales) to remove inferior alternatives. These concepts translate into economic language some human choice heuristics studied in psychology and explain cyclical patterns of choice observed in experiments. We study some properties of sequential rationalizability and provide a full characterization of choice functions rationalizable by two and three rationales. (JEL D0). a maximizer for it. In this paper, we propose and study a family of boundedly rational choice procedures that can account for these observed anomalies.
In line with some prominent psychology and marketing studies (see below), in our model we assume that the decision maker uses sequen tially two rationales to discriminate among the available alternatives. These rationales are applied in a fixed order, independently of the choice set, to remove inferior alternatives. This procedure "sequentially rationalizes" a choice function if, for any feasible set, the process identifies the unique alternative specified by the choice function. In this case, we say that a choice function is a Rational Shortlist Method (RSM). Intuitively, the first rationale identifies a shortlist of candidate alternatives from which the second rationale selects. The special case in (2000) find that the majority (52 percent) of choices exhib ited binary cycles in a universal choice set of four alterna tives. In the experiment carried out in Loomes, Starmer, and Sugden (99) , between 4 percent and 29 percent of choices made by all subjects were cyclical, and a staggering 64 percent of subjects exhibited at least one binary cycle in a universal choice set of just three alternatives. More recent results in this same line are in Pavlo Blavatskyy (2003) , who finds that 55 percent of his experimental subjects violate transitivity of choice. Humans seem to fare better than nonhuman animals: for instance, in an experiment of choice behavior of gray jays, Thomas A. Waite (200) finds that all the birds preferred choices a to b and b to c, but none preferred a over c, where all alternatives 1n, l 2 consisted in going and getting n raisins at the end of a lcm long tube, with a 5 1 raisin, 28 cm2 , b 5 12 raisins, 42 cm2 , and c 5 13 raisins, 56 cm2 . Thus, none of the birds exhibited transitive choice; moreover, 25 percent of them exhibited consistently intransitive choice. which the first rationale always yields a unique maximal element corresponds to the standard model of rationality.
A notable aspect of these procedures is that they are testable based on a "revealed prefer ence" type of analysis that, despite the highly nonstandard choices to be explained, is not more demanding than the standard one.
2 In other words, we ask the following question: when are observed choices compatible with the use of our boundedly rational choice procedure? The answer is: if and only if the choice data satisfy two testable conditions. Of these conditions, one is a standard Expansion axiom, and the other is a modification of Samuelson's Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP) . 3 The simplicity of our tests stands in contrast to the indirect esti mation algorithms normally used (notably in the marketing literature) to infer boundedly rational procedures. 4 Typically, RSMs will lack standard menuinde pendence properties, so that it may be possible for an alternative to be revealed as preferable to another alternative in some choice set, but for that preference to be reversed in a different choice set (thus violating WARP). Because of this feature, RSMs can exhibit cyclical patterns of choice; however, they still rule out other types of irratio nal choice. In this sense, an RSM is a nonvacuous notion and this gives it empirical content: it can be tested by observable choice data.
For a simple example of how an RSM works, suppose that an arbitrator has to pick one from the available allocations a, b, or c. Suppose that c Pareto dominates a, while no other Pareto comparisons are possible. Assume further that the arbitrator deems a fairer than b and b fairer than c. The arbitrator decides first on the basis of the Pareto criterion, invoking the fairness cri terion only when Pareto is not decisive. Then, the arbitrator's choice function g would be such that g 15a, b, c 62 5 b, since, first, a is eliminated by c using the Pareto criterion, and, second, c is eliminated by b using the fairness criterion. On the other hand, g 15a, b 62 5 a, given that the Pareto criterion has no bite, and the arbitrator would select on the basis of fairness. Similarly, g 15b, c 62 5 b, whereas g 15a, c 62 5 c by Pareto. This seems an entirely reasonable way for the arbitrator to come to a decision. In fact, this pro cedure has been proposed in a social choice set ting by Koichi Tadenuma (2002) . Yet it produces a violation of WARP and pairwise cyclical pat tern of choice.
One can think of a wide array of other practi cal situations where RSMs may apply. A cau tious investor comparing alternative portfolios first eliminates those that are too risky relative to others available, and then ranks the surviving ones on the basis of expected returns. A recruit ing selector first excludes candidates with lower levels of some desired skills than other appli cants he is considering, and then selects based on merit from the remaining ones. The notion of RSM is relevant also in other fields in the social sciences. For instance, psychologists have often insisted on sequential "noncompensatory" 5 heu ristics, as opposed to one single rationale, to explain choices (though axiomatic character izations of such boundedly rational procedures are lacking). Notable in this respect are the "Elimination by Aspects" procedure of Tversky (972) and the idea of "fast and frugal heuris tics" of Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter M. Todd, and the ABC Research Group (999). Similarly, this type of model is widely used and documented in the management/marketing literature. Yee et al. (forthcoming) provide recent and compelling evidence of the use by consumers of "twostage consideration and choice" decisionmaking pro cedures, and also refer to firms taking account of this fact in product development.
In summary, RSMs are simple boundedly rational procedures that are introspectively plausible and can explain empirically rel evant "anomalies" of choice patterns. Above all, whether the choice pattern of a decision maker can be explained by an RSM is a testable hypothesis. Last but not least, RSMs provide rigorous formal underpinnings to the heuristics approach central to much psychology and mar keting literature.
In addition to providing a characterization of RSMs, we consider a natural extension whereby the decision maker applies sequentially more than two rationales, much in the same way as they are used in the elimination procedure described before for RSMs. We call choice functions recoverable in this way sequentially rationalizable. Although a full characterization of sequentially rationalizable choice functions remains a nontrivial open problem, we are able to present some partial results, notably includ ing a full characterization of rationalizability by three rationales. Interestingly, even when the number of rationales allowed is unboundedly large, not all choice functions are sequentially rationalizable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we define and characterize RSMs. In Section II we extend RSMs to sequen tial rationalizability. Section III presents an application to choice over time. We conclude in Section IV. Some technical examples are in the Appendices.
I. Rational Shortlist Methods

A. Basic definitions
Let X be a set of alternatives, with 0X0 . 2. Given S # X and an asymmetric binary relation P # X 3 X, denote the set of Pmaximal ele ments of S by max 1S; P2 5 5x [ SZE y y [ S for which 1y, x2 [ P6.
Let P 1X2 denote the set of all nonempty sub sets of X. A choice function on X selects one alternative from each possible element of P 1X2 , so it is a function g : P 1X2 S X with g 1S2 [ S for all S [ P 1X2. We abuse notation by often suppressing set delimiters, e.g., writing g 1xy 2 in place of g 15x, y 62.
The main result in this section (Theorem ) goes through (as can be easily checked by an inspection of the proof) whether the choice sets S are finite or not. For simplicity of notation, however, we confine ourselves to the case where X is finite.
Since Paul A. Samuelson's (938) paper, economists have sought to express choice as the outcome of maximizing behavior. Formally, a choice function g is rationalizable if there exists an acyclic binary relation P, such that 5g 1S2 6 5 max 1S; P2 for all S [ P 1X2.
The main new concept we introduce is the following.
DEFINITION :
A choice function g is an RSM whenever there exists an ordered pair 1P , P 2 2 of asymmetric relations, with P i # X 3 X for i 5 , 2, such that: 5g 1S2 6 5 max 1max 1S; P 2; P 2 2 for all S [ P 1X2.
in that case we say that 1P , P 2 2 sequentially rationalize g. We call each P i a rationale.
So the choice from each S can be represented as if the decision maker went through two sequential rounds of elimination of alternatives. In the first round, he retains only the elements that are maximal according to rationale P . In the second round, he retains only the element that is maximal according to rationale P 2 : that is his choice. Note that, crucially, the rationales and the sequence in which they are applied are invariant with respect to the choice set.
This choice procedure departs from (stan dard) rational choice only when the relation P is incomplete. The relation P 2 may or may not be complete, though it needs to be decisive on the shortlist created after the first round of elimina tion, i.e., select from it a single element.
B. An Example
To glean some intuition on what RSMs can and cannot do, let us consider an example where two types of "pathologies of choice" are dis played. We show in the next section that the decomposition of pathologies illustrated in the example is very general; of these, only one can be accommodated by an RSM.
Suppose that the decision maker can conceiv ably choose among three alternative routes to go to work, A, B, and C. Because of periodic road closures, we can observe his choices also between subsets of the grand set 5A, B, C6. Up to a relabelling of the alternatives, it is not difficult to check that there are only three possible con figurations of choice behavior. Fix the route that is taken when all are available, say route A. Then, consider the situation when, at any one time, only two routes are available. Those that follow exhaust all possible choices: 6 Case 1 (dominance of the best route).-Route A (the choice from the grand set) is also taken whenever only one other route is avail able, regardless of the choice when A is not available.
Case 2 (Pairwise cycle of choice).-Route A is taken when B is the only other available route; route B is taken when C is the only other avail able route; route C is taken when A is the only other available route.
Case 3 (default route).-Some route differ ent from A is always taken when only one other route is available, regardless of the choice when A is available.
These cases are depicted in Figure , where arrows point away from the selected route to the rejected one in pairwise choice.
Case can be rationalized in the standard way, with only one transitive preference relation such that A is preferred to both B and C.
Case 2 is pathological from the point of view of standard economic rationality. Nonetheless, it can be sequentially rationalized by two ratio nales-let us call them "traffic" and "length"-as follows. The decision maker prefers less traffic to more, and prefers shorter routes. Route C is shorter than Route A, and Route A is shorter than route B. Route B has less traffic 6 Let Xty denote "route X is taken when route y is also available." Then, it is easy to see that, once we fix the route selected when all are available, there are eight possible combinations of routes chosen in each of the three possible pairwise comparisons between A and B, A and C, and B and C, namely: () AtB, AtC, and BtC; (2) AtB, AtC, and CtB; (3) AtB, BtC, and CtA; (4) BtA, AtC, and CtB; (5) BtA, BtC, and AtC; (6) BtA, BtC, and CtA; (7) CtA, CtB, and AtB; and (8) CtA, CtB, and BtA. Of these possibilities, () and (2) corre spond to Case in the text; (3) and (4) are the same, subject to relabelling by switching B and C, and correspond to Case 2 in the text; and, finally, both (5) and (7), and (6) and (8) are the same subject to swapping B for C, and correspond to Case 3 in the text. than route C, but traffic comparisons are hard to make between other routes. The decision maker looks first at traffic to eliminate routes, and then at length. It is immediate to see that the crite ria applied in the given sequence generate the choice behavior of Case 2.
In Case 3, a different pathology of choice is observed. There is one route, say B to fix ideas, that is revealed preferred in pairwise choices to all other routes, yet it is not chosen when all routes are available (as in Figure , Case 3a). This pattern of choice is not an RSM. To see this, suppose to the contrary that this were an RSM, again with rationales "traffic" and "length" applied in that order. If so, the fact that B is chosen in pairwise comparison over A means that if B and A are comparable by traffic, then B has less traffic than A. Otherwise, B must be shorter than A. Similarly, since B is chosen in pairwise comparison over C, either B has less traffic than C, or is shorter (or both). But then, when all three routes are available, B can never be eliminated by either the traffic or the length criterion. This contradicts the initial hypothesis that the choice was an RSM. We shall see later that this reasoning can be generalized to more complex cases, and in fact it would stand even if the number of possible criteria were not limited 
C. Characterization of Rational Shortlist Methods
In general, suppose that we observed the choices of a decision maker. How could we test whether his behavior is consistent with the sequential maximization of two rationales? Surprisingly, it turns out that RSMs can be sim ply characterized through two familiar observ able properties of choice.
Recall, first, the standard WARP pioneered by Samuelson (938) for consumer theory.
WARP: if an alternative x is chosen when y is available, then y is not chosen when x is available. Formally, for all S, T
It is well known that (in the present setting) WARP is a necessary and sufficient condition for choice to be rationalized by an ordering (i.e., a complete transitive binary relation).
7 WARP essentially asserts the absence of a certain type of "menu effects" in choice: if an alternative is revealed preferred to another within a cer tain "menu" of alternatives, changing the menu cannot reverse this judgement. The property we introduce allows menu effects, but requires some consistency in the way they operate. It is in the following spirit: if you are observed to choose steak over fish when they are the only items on the menu, and also when a large selec tion of pizzas is on the menu, then you do not choose fish over steak when a small selection of pizzas is on the menu. A pairwise prefer ence for x over y does not exclude in principle that in larger menus some reason can be found to reject x and choose y instead. However, if a large menu does not contain any such reason, no smaller menu contains such a reason either. Although this property may look introspectively plausible, here we are not interested in issues of plausibility: we simply propose this property as an observable test for the RSM model. 7 See, e.g., Hervé Moulin (985) 
The second property we use in our character ization is called Expansion, and it directly rules out pathologies of the type considered in Case 3 of the route example above.
EXPANSION: An alternative chosen from each of two sets is also chosen from their union.
Formally, for all S, T [ P 1X2: 3x 5 g 1S2 5 g 1T 24 1 3x 5 g 1S < T2 4.
Our main result can now be stated as follows.
THEOREM : Let X be any (not necessarily finite) set. A choice function g on X is an RSM, if and only if it satisfies Expansion and Weak WARP.
PROOF:
Necessity: Let g be an RSM on X and let P and P 2 be the rationales.
(a) Expansion. Let x 5 g 1S2 5 g 1T2 for S, T [ P 1X2. We show that for any y [ S < T, it cannot be 1y, x 2 [ P , and for any y [ max 1S < T ; P 2 , it cannot be 1y, x 2 [ P 2 . If 1y, x 2 [ P , this would immediately contradict x 5 g 1S2 or x 5 g 1T 2 and g being rationalized. Suppose, now, that for some y [ max 1S < T ; P 2 we had 1y, x 2 [ P 2 . Since max 1S < T ; P 2 # max 1S; P 2 < max 1T ; P 2 , we have y [ max 1S; P 2 or y [ max 1T ; P 2 , contradicting x [ max 1max 1S; P 2; P 2 2 or x [ max 1max 1T; P 2; P 2 2.
Therefore, x survives both rounds of elimina tion and we can conclude that x 5 g 1S < T 2. 8 8 Note that this argument cannot be iterated further in the case of more than two rationales. For any set S [ P 1X2 , let M 1S2 5 max 1S; P 2 and M 2 1S2 5 max 1 max 1S; P 2; P 2 2 . Then, observe that it is not necessarily true that
(b) Weak WARP. Let x 5 g 1xy 2 5 g 1S2 , y [ S. Then x 5 g 1xy 2 implies that 1x, y 2 [ P < P 2 . If 1x, y 2 [ P , then the desired con clusion follows immediately. Suppose, then, that 1x, y 2 [ P 2 . The fact that x 5 g 1S2 implies that for all z [ S it is the case that 1z, x 2 o P . Therefore, x [ max 1R; P 2 for all R ( S for which x [ R. Since 1x, y 2 [ P 2 , then y o max 1max 1R; P 2; P 2 2 for all such R, and thus y Z g 1R2.
Sufficiency: Suppose that g satisfies the axi oms. We construct the rationales explicitly. Define
such that y 5 g 1S2 and x [ S6.
Define 1x, y 2 [ P 2 if and only if x 5 g 1xy 2.
Observe that P and P 2 are asymmetric: if 1x, y 2 [ P and 1y, x 2 [ P then, in particular, g 1xy 2 Z x, y, which is not possible; and P 2 is con sistent with the binary choices.
To check that P and P 2 rationalize g, take any S [ P 1X2 and let x 5 g 1S2. First, we show that all alternatives that are chosen over x in binary choice are eliminated in the first round. Second, we show that x survives both rounds, and that it eliminates all remaining alternatives in the sec ond round.
Let z [ S be such that z 5 g 1xz2. 
Clearly x is not eliminated by either P or P 2 : for y [ S, if 1y, x 2 [ P , then, it could not be x 5 g 1S2 , whereas if 1y, x 2 [ P 2 by the argu ment in the previous paragraph, y would have been eliminated by the application of P before P 2 can be applied.
Finally for all z [ max 1S, P 2 , with z Z x, such that x 5 g 1xz2 , we have 1x, z2 [ P 2 .
As discussed above, the strength of this characterization lies in the fact that it con nects what would be traditionally considered highly "irrational" choice patterns to easyto check rationality properties. The only relax ation from standard tests is to allow a limited form of menu-dependence in the Weak WARP axiom.
In Appendix A, we establish by means of examples that the set of axioms in Theorem is tight.
REMARK : There isn't a unique way to construct the rationales. One algorithm that performs the task is the following: (i) if an alternative x is never chosen when y is present, then assign 1y, x 2 to the first rationale P ; (ii) if x "beats" y in pairwise comparison, then assign 1y, x 2 to the second rationale P 2 .
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Theorem can be extended to choice func tions on any subdomain S , P 1X2. The follow ing property, which we use to this effect below, combines in a single property Weak WARP and Expansion.
WWE: If x 5 g 1S i 2 in a class and x 5 g 1xy 2 , then y Z g 1R2 for all R [ P 1X2 with 5x, y 6 , R # < i S i .
WWE says that if you choose pizza over steak when only pizza and steak are available, then you don't choose steak from a menu contain ing pizza and some other items, all taken from menus from which pizza is chosen. The previous RSM characterization in terms of Expansion and Weak WARP may not work on restricted domains due to the possible lack of closure under set union of these domains. 0 However, WWE solves this difficulty. For any subdomain S , P 1X2 , we refer to a function g : S S X as a choice function on S. By following essentially the same argument of the proof of the main the orem, it is easy to show the following. 9 Note that in this construction there is a onetoone relationship between violations of WARP and differences between the two rationales. In fact, if 1x, y 2 [ P , then clearly, by definition, 1x, y 2 o P 2. Therefore, the only pos sible difference between the two rationales is when there are two alternatives x and y such that 1x, y 2 , 1y, x 2 o P and 1x, y 2 o P 2 . This is a violation of WARP. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out to us. 0 To be more precise, we may not be able to carry out the step in which we assert that since y 5 g 1T z 2 for a class of sets 5T z 6, then y 5 g 1< z T z 2 , since < z T z may not be in the domain.
COROLLARY : A choice function g on S , P 1X2 is an RSM if and only if it satisfies WWE.
To conclude this section, we note that, were one to allow a decision maker to apply two ratio nales in a variable order, depending on the prob lem, then many more choice functions could be rationalized. In other words, it would be inter esting to consider the following definition.
Say that a choice function g is a menu dependent RSM if there exists a pair of rationales P , P 2 such that 5g 1S2 6 [ 5 max 1max 1S; P 2; P 2 2 , max 1max 1S; P 2 2; P 2 6 for all S [ S.
We do not know at present which choice func tions can be rationalized in this way.
We recall the result by Gil Kalai, Ariel Rubinstein, and Rani Spiegler (2002) , in whose model one single rationalizing relation is used on each choice set, but the relation may vary from one choice set to another. Each relation is assumed to be an order (so it is complete and transitive), and several relations are in general needed to rationalize a choice function.
II. Beyond Two Rationales
A. Sequential Rationalizability
The concept of an RSM suggests an imme diate generalization. Instead of using only two rationales, the decision maker might use a larger number of them. For example, in the routes sce nario of the previous section, one can conceive that the decision maker uses not only traffic and length, but also scenery, as criteria for choice. This leads us to the following definition.
DEFINITION 2: A choice function g is sequentially rationalizable whenever there exists an ordered list P , … , P K of asymmetric relations, with P i # X 3 X for i 5 … K, such that, defining recursively,
in that case, we say that 1P , … , P K 2 sequentially rationalize g. We call each P i a rationale. if we want to emphasize the fact that no more than K rationales are needed, we call the choice function K-sequentially rationalizable.
So the choice from each S can be constructed through sequential rounds of elimination of alternatives. At each round, only the ele ments that are maximal according to a round specific rationale survive. Like for RSMs (which can now be viewed as special sequentially ratio nalizable choice functions where only two ratio nales are used), the rationales and the sequence are invariant with respect to the choice set.
Are there choices that are not sequentially rationalizable? At first sight, it may seem that if we are free to use as many rationales as we like, any choice can be rationalized by a sufficiently large number of rationales. On the contrary, the answer may be negative even for very simple choice functions (on a domain X with as few as three alternatives). Examples are provided in Appendix A.
B. Violations of Economic Rationality Are of Only Two Types
To delve deeper into the notion of sequen tial rationalizability, let us recall another well known property of choice.
independence of irrelevant Alternatives.-
If an alternative is chosen from a set, it remains chosen when some rejected alternatives are dis carded from the set. Formally, for all S, T [ P 1X2:3g 1T 2 [ S, S , T 4 1 3g 1S2 5 g 1T 2 4 .
Recall that, at least for the finite case, Indepen dence of Irrelevant Alternatives is equivalent to For singlevalued choice functions, this conflates several properties of correspondences such as Chernoff's WARP and therefore is a necessary and suffi cient condition for rationalizability with a single ordering.
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What types of boundedly rational behav ior does sequential rationalizability allow? To answer this question consider the following two very basic rationality requirements. The first one requires that if an alternative "beats" all others in a set in binary choices, then this same alterna tive is chosen from the set-this is obviously a weakening of Expansion. The second property requires that there are no pairwise cycles of choice-this is a weakening of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and WARP:
Always Chosen.-If an alternative is chosen in pairwise choices over all other alternatives in a set, then it is chosen from the set. Formally, for all S [ P 1X2: 3x 5 g 1xy 2 for all y [ S\ x 4 1 3x 5 g 1S2 4 .
No Binary Cycles.-There are no pairwise cycles of choice. Formally, for all x , … , x n1 [ X: 3g 1x i x i1 2 5 x i , i 5 , … , n 4 1 3x 5 g 1x x n1 2 4 .
The reason for highlighting these two proper ties is that the class of choice functions that do not satisfy WARP (i.e., that are not rationaliz able by a single standard economic preference relation) can be classified very simply. They are partitioned into just three subclasses: the choice functions that violate exactly one of No Binary Cycles or Always Chosen, and those that violate both. This is established in the Proposition , which is of independent interest.
PROPOSITION : A choice function that violates WARP also violates Always Chosen or No Binary Cycles.
PROOF:
It is easier to conduct the proof in terms of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives rather than the equivalent property WARP. Let g be a choice function on X. We argue by induc tion on the cardinality of X. Let X 5 5x, y, z6.
2 See, e.g., Moulin (985) and Suzumura (983) .
Suppose that x 5 g 1X2 and y 5 g 1xy 2 , so that Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is vio lated. There are two possibilities: if y 5 g 1yz2 , then Always Chosen is violated; if, instead, z 5 g 1yz2 , then either Always Chosen is violated (if z 5 g 1xz2 2 , or No Binary Cycles is violated (if x 5 g 1xz2 , so that x 5 g 1xz2 , z 5 g 1yz2 , y 5 g 1yx 2 2. Assume now that the statement holds for all sets X with Z X Z # n. Take Xr such that Z X9 Z 5 n 1 1. Suppose that x 5 g 1X92 but there exists 5x, y 6 # S , X9 such that y 5 g 1S2. If the restriction of g to S violates Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, then the result follows by the inductive hypothesis. Suppose, then, that the restriction of g to S satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. Consider the set V 5 Xr\S. Obviously, V Z [, and let z 5 g 1V2.
If the restriction of g to V violates Indepen dence of Irrelevant Alternatives, then the result follows by the inductive hypothesis. Suppose it satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alterna tives. Then, z 5 g 1vz2 for all v [ V \ z.
Suppose that z 5 g 1yz2. If z 5 g 1sz2 for all s [ S, then Always Chosen is violated. If there exists some t [ S such that t 5 g 1tz2 , then this generates the cycle t 5 g 1tz2 , z 5 g 1yz2 , y 5 g 1ty 2 , where the last relation follows from Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives on S.
Suppose, alternatively, that y 5 g 1yz2. If y 5 g 1sy 2 for all s [ V, then Always Chosen is violated. If there exists some t [ V such that t 5 g 1ty 2 , then this generates the cycle t 5 g 1ty 2 , y 5 g 1yz2 , z 5 g 1tz2 , where the last relation fol lows from Independence of Irrelevant Alterna tives on V.
C. Sequential Rationalizability Excludes One Type of irrational Behavior
Next, we show that sequential rationalizabil ity restricts violations of the two basic rational ity properties introduced in this section.
LEMMA : if a choice function is sequentially rationalizable, it satisfies Always Chosen.
PROOF:
Let g on X be sequentially rationalizable by the rationales P , P 2 … P K . For any two alternatives ThE AMERiCAN ECONOMiC REViEW a, b [ X, let i1a, b 2 be the smallest i such that P i relates a and b, that is
Given S # X and x [ S, let x 5 g 1xy 2 for all y [ S \ x. For each y [ S \ x, we must have 1x, y 2 [ P i (x, y) , so that the successive application of the rationales eliminates all y [ S \ x, and no ratio nale can eliminate x. Therefore, x 5 g 1S2 , as desired.
Our partial characterization result shows the equivalence of WARP and No Binary Cycles on the domain of sequentially rationalizable choice functions; it follows from Proposition and Lemma by observing that WARP is violated if there is a binary cycle.
THEOREM 2: A sequentially rationalizable choice function violates WARP, if and only if it exhibits binary cycles.
Thus, the results in this section generalize the message of the basic "routes" example of the previous section. We have established that, in general, and not only in that example, all viola tions of "rationality" can be traced back to two elementary pathologies of choice, corresponding to Case 2 and Case 3 of the routes example: vio lations of Always Chosen and No Binary Cycles. Like RSMs, even the more general notion of sequential rationalizability is intimately con nected with pairwise cycles of choice, and can not possibly explain the other pathology.
D. A Recursion Lemma
In this section and the next, we provide con ditions on observable choices that fully charac terize 3rationalizable choice functions. In the course of doing this, we also provide a recur sive result that permits one to move from any given characterization of 1K 2 22 -rationalizable choices to K-rationalizable choices, thus pro viding a basis for a general characterization of sequential rationalizability.
To this aim, we need to extend some of the previous definitions to choice correspondences.
A choice correspondence on X selects a set of alternatives from each possible element of P 1X2: so it is a setvalued map g : P 1X2 S X with g 1S2 # S for all S [ P 1X2. The definitions of sequential rationalizability and RSM extend in the obvious way.
Any choice correspondence g on X defines naturally a subdomain S 1g2 , defined as follows:
In words, S 1g2 contains all the sets in the full domain P 1X2 that coincide with the choice that g produces from some element of the full domain.
Now we are ready to state our key result. 
(ii) the restriction of g to S 1g
This result shows that the process of selection for a sequentially rationalizable choice function g can be recursively broken down into two steps. First, a sequentially rationalizable "preselection" is made, described as a choice correspondence g * which contains the chosen alternative for each set. This choice correspondence is sequentially rationalizable with two fewer rationales than the given choice function. In the second step, a choice function is applied to the preselected sets. This choice function satisfies WWE on that domain and is just the restriction of the given choice function g to the preselected sets.
PROOF OF THE RECURSION LEMMA:
Let g be K-sequentially rationalizable by P … , P K . The sequential application of P , … , P K 2 2 defines a 1K 2 22 -sequentially rationalizable choice correspondence on X, say g * . It must be g 1g * 1S2 2 5 g 1S2 for all S [ P 1X2 , since both the lefthand side and the right hand side are obtained by applying exactly the same rationales, exactly in the same sequence. The restriction of g to S 1g * 2 is an RSM with rationales P K21 and P K , since by definition of S 1g * 2 the first K 2 2 rationales produce no effect when applied to any element of S 1g * 2 (as they have already been used), and only the rationales P K21 and P K will be effective. Then the state ment follows by Corollary .
That g is sequentially rationalizable (say by P , … , P K ) if the conditions of the statement hold is obvious: the first K 2 2 rationales are those that rationalize g * , while P K21 and P k are the rationales that rationalize the restriction of g to S 1g *
2.
The Recursion Lemma is useful as an observ able test for sequential rationalizability, provided one also has observable conditions that characterize sequential rationalizability of a lower order for choice correspondences. In gen eral, we still lack such conditions for general correspondences, except for the case where g * is rationalizable by just one rationale, as shown in the next section.
E. A Characterization of 3-Rationalizability
A classical result of choice theory uses the following condition on choice correspondences (e.g., Moulin 985; Suzumura 983). Binariness says that an alternative is chosen from a set, if and only if it is chosen in binary contests with any other alternative in the set. This means that the choice function is deter mined entirely by its behavior on binary sets. Amartya Sen (970) proved that a choice corre spondence g on P 1X2 is rationalized by a binary relation P, if and only if g satisfies binariness.
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Thanks to this fact, we can "solve" the case of 3rationalizability.
THEOREM 3: A choice function g is 3-sequentially rationalizable if and only if there exists a choice correspondence g
* on X such that:
(ii) the restriction of g to S 1g * 2 satisfies WWE;
(iii) g * satisfies binariness.
PROOF:
The result follows directly from Corollary and Sen's theorem, with one observation. If there is a P as in Sen's theorem (necessarily complete since g 1xy 2 is well defined for all x, y [ X), then there is an asymmetric relation Pr such that 1y, g 1S2 2 [ P9 for no S [ P 1X2 and y [ S (i.e., g maximizes Pr ). The relation Pr is just the asymmetric part of P.
This result provides a characterization of 3 rationalizability exclusively in terms of condi tions on observed choice. It involves checking an axiom of the standard expansioncontraction type for a set of choice functions rather than just for the original one. In practice, the result defines an algorithm that uses the choice data provided by g, as follows:
Step 1: Consider all the possible choice corre spondences g * defined only on binary sets, and such that g 1xy 2 [ g * 1xy 2 for all x, y [ X.
Step 2: Fix a g * from step , extend it to P 1X2 
1S2.
If the extension is not pos sible (i.e., it yields an empty set), pick a different g * from step , and repeat.
Step 3: Check if g on S 1g
* 2 satisfies WWE. If it does, move to step 4. If not, repeat step 2 with a different g * .
Step 4: Check if g 1g * 1S2 2 5 g 1S2 for all S [ P 1X2. If it does, the original choice func tion is 3rationalizable. If not, repeat step 2 with a different g * . If the answer is negative for all choice correspondences, then the original choice function is not 3rationalizable.
An example of an application of this algo rithm, also illustrating some practical shortcuts, is given in Appendix B.
III. Rational Shortlist Methods and
Choice over Time
Throughout the paper, we have focused on gen eral violations of rationality. However, we believe that RSMs can prove very useful to explain other consider a complete binary preference relation B over a set of dateoutcome pairs. They axi omatize the following representation class: 1x, t 2 B 1y, s 2 , if and only if u 1x 2 $ u 1y 2 1 w 1s, m t 2 , where u is interpreted as an instantaneous util ity function, while w captures the effect of time delay. Unlike our setup, this representation is not an interval order, and the "contributions" of outcome and time to the agent's utility are sepa rated. In Ok and Masatlioglu's approach, cycles can be accounted for without resorting to a sec ond partial order. Our view is different: the first partial order represents the "rational" though incomplete component of decision making; hence we assume it transitive. In our approach, intransitivities arise as the byproduct of resort ing to the "tiebreaking" second rationale.
IV. Concluding Remarks
We have proposed an economic, "revealed preference" approach to the type of decision making procedures often promoted by psy chologists. For example Gigerenzer and Todd (999) in their work on "fast and frugal" heu ristics observe, "One way to select a single option from multiple alternatives is to follow the simple principle of elimination: successive cues are used to eliminate more and more alter natives and thereby reduce the set of remaining options, until a single option can be decided upon." Such heuristics focus mostly on the sim plicity of cues used to narrow down possible candidates for choice. Simplicity is an essen tial virtue in a world in which time is limited. An overarching preference relation-let alone a utility function-is not a cognitively simple object, and as a consequence these authors stress the difference from heuristicsbased rea soning and the "unlimited demonic or super natural reasoning" relied upon in economics. 4 Yet, in this paper we have shown that the stan dard tools, concepts, and properties of revealed preference theory can be used to formalize and infer the use of such heuristics. A seemingly limited form of menudependence (encapsu lated in our Weak WARP and Expansion prop erties) is equivalent to the use of a twostage 4 See Gigerenzer and Todd (999). choice anomalies in specific contexts, in which certain rationales can suggest themselves. Here, we consider an application to choice over time.
The standard model of choice over time is the exponential discounting model. It has been observed that actual choices in experimen tal settings consistently violate its predictions. The most notable violation is possibly prefer ence reversal. Let P g refer to observed pairwise choices over dateoutcome pairs 1x, t 2 [ X 3 T, where X is a set of monetary outcomes and T is a set of dates. In this context, preference rever sal is the shorthand for the following situation: 1x, t x 2 P g 1y, t y 2 and 1y, t y 1 t 2 P g 1x, t x 1 t 2. This violates stationarity of time preferences, a prem ise on which the exponential discounting model is constructed.
This choice pattern can be easily accounted for by interpreting g as an RSM with rationales P and P 2 defined as follows. For some function u : X 3 T S R and number s . 0, 1x, t x 2P 1y, t y 2 , if and only if u 1x, t x 2 . u 1y, t y 2 1 s, and 1x, t x 2P 2 1y, t y 2 , if and only if u 1y, t y 2 # u 1x, t x 2 # u 1y, t y 2 1 s, and either x . y, or x 5 y and t x , t y . That is, the decision maker looks first at dis counted value, and chooses one alternative over the other if it exceeds the discounted value of the latter by an amount of at least s. Otherwise he looks first at the outcome dimension and, if this is not decisive, at the time dimension. This is compatible with preference reversal, even with an exponential discounting type of u function. Let x , y, t x , t y and u 1x, t x 2 5 xd t x for d [ 10, 2. Suppose that xd t x . yd t y 1 s so that 1x, t x 2 is chosen over 1y, t y 2 by application of P . Given s, if t is sufficiently large it will be xd t x 1t , yd t y 1t 1 s, so that the two dateoutcome pairs 1x, t x 1 t 2 and 1y, t y 1 t 2 are not comparable via P . However, the application of P 2 yields the choice of 1y, t y 1 t 2 over 1x, t x 1 t 2 , thus "revers ing the (revealed) preference."
Obviously, P g could also be sequentially rationalized by using three rationales, where the outcome and time dimension comparisons are used in two separate P i .
The same model can explain cyclical intertem poral choices and other "anomalies" (see Mariotti 2006a, and bibliography therein, notably Rubinstein 2003 , who proposes a multi stage procedure based on similarity relations).
Our model differs from that in Efe A. Ok and Yusufcan Masatlioglu (forthcoming) , who procedure that may generate economically "irrational" choice behavior.
Our way of incorporating bounded rationality is to translate the psychological notion of "cues" into a set of not necessarily complete binary rela tions. Rationality for us is the consistent appli cation of a sequence of rationales. The order in which they are applied may be hardwired and may depend on the specific context and on the type of decision maker, 5 but it should be the same in a relevant class of decision problems. Each single rationale in itself need not exhibit any other strong property, such as completeness or transitivity.
The usefulness of elimination heuristics in practical decision making is selfevident 6 and widely spread in disparate fields, from clinical medicine 7 to marketing and management. In this perspective, the sequentiality in the application of rationales, which lies at the core of our analy sis, is an appealing feature of our rationalization results. Our approach may be contrasted with the recent contribution by Kalai, Rubinstein, and Spiegler (2002) and José Apesteguia and Miguel A. Ballester (2005) . They use multiple rationales to explain choices, but each rationale is applied to a subset of the domain of choice. This results in all choice functions being rationalizable, and the focus becomes that of "counting" the mini mum number of rationales necessary to explain choices. One could imagine adapting a similar approach in our framework, by making the order of application of the rationales dependent on the set to which they are applied. Whether this would reduce the number of rationales needed to explain choices is still an open problem.
5 For example, in order to "choose" whether to stay or flee in the presence of a bird, a rabbit may use as its first rationale the fact that the bird is gliding, which would iden tify a predator. Conversely, a human decision maker may well look first at size or shape in order to recognize the bird.
6 As put very effectively by Gigerenzer and Todd (999), "If we can decide quickly and with few cues whether an approaching person or bear is interested in fighting, play ing, or courting, we will have more time to prepare and act accordingly (though in the case of the bear all three inten tions may be equally unappealing)."
7 As an example, the online selfhelp guide of the UK National Health Service (http://www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk/ SelfHelp/symptoms/) helps users recognize an ailment by giving yes/no answers along a sequence of symptoms. This presumably formalizes the mental process of a trained doctor.
A different and intriguing approach to the theme of "simplifying" choice problems is pur sued by Yuval Salant (2003) , who shows how a rational choice function can be viewed as being minimally complicated from a computational theoretic point of view.
Recently, Rubinstein and Salant (2006) have also discussed the use of the revealed preference approach to explain "behavioral" phenomena, and they provide an alternative characterization of RSMs in a different framework. In this same spirit, Masatlioglu and Ok (2003) character ize the phenomenon of status quo dependence in terms of axioms on observable choice data. And Kfir Eliaz and Ok (2006) weaken WARP for choice correspondences to characterize the rationalization by a not necessarily complete preference relation.
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In Manzini and Mariotti (2006b) , we consider a twostage elimination procedure in which, in the first stage, the relation is applied to sets of alternatives instead of to the alternatives them selves. The interpretation is that, in the first stage, alternatives are grouped by "similarity" and the elimination is between "similarity groups." Interestingly, that procedure is characterized by Weak WARP alone, and therefore it can explain even those choices that violate Always Chosen, besides exhibiting pairwise cycles. 9 We should also mention the work by Ok (2004) , which characterizes the choice corre spondences satisfying Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives by means of a twostage procedure. Unlike this paper, in the second stage of Ok's procedure, elimination of alternatives does not occur on the basis of a relation, but rather on the information contained in the entire feasible set.
To conclude, we observe that recently Lars Ehlers and Yves Sprumont (2006) and Michele 8 They propose the following Weak Axiom of Revealed NonInferiority (WARNI): for any y [ S, if for every x [ g 1S2 there exists a choice set T such that y [ g 1T 2 and x [ T, then y [ g 1S2 . They prove that WARNI is equivalent to rationalization by a single but possibly incomplete pref erence relation. Our WEE seems reminiscent of WARNI. As Case 2 of the route example shows, however, there are (singlevalued) choice correspondences that satisfy WWE but violate WARNI: so, not all RSMs can be rationalized by a single and possibly incomplete preference relation. 9 We also present experimental evidence to show that this type of choices is empirically relevant in certain contexts. ThE AMERiCAN ECONOMiC REViEW Example 2. Weak WARP but not Expansion:
Binary choices are visualized in Figure 3 . While this choice function satisfies Weak WARP (trivially, as the premise of Weak WARP does not apply), it fails Expansion. This choice func tion is not an RSM. Indeed, it is not sequentially rationalizable. As before, for any two alterna tives a, b [ X, let i1a, b 2 be the smallest i such that P i relates a and b. Suppose by contradic tion that g were sequentially rationalizable by P , … , P K . Since x 5 g 1xy 2 , it must be 1x, y 2 [ P i 1x, y 2 . Given this, y 5 g 1xyz2 can hold only if 1z, x 2 [ P i 1x, z2 , which contradicts x 5 g 1xz2.
The examples above can be used to make two additional points. First, there are choice functions that are not RSMs but are sequen tially rationalizable. Namely, g in Example is 3rationalizable, as shown in Appendix B. Second, the notion of sequential rationalizabil ity is not vacuous, in the sense that there exist choice functions thar are not sequentially ratio nalizable (Example 2). 2 2 The violations of Always Chosen shown in this exam ple appear in other notable examples of plausible choice pro cedures introduced in the literature, which are therefore not sequentially rationalizable. Let X 5 5x, y, z6, and consider the following refinement of the choose the median proce dure: There is a "fundamental" order B on X (e.g., given by ideology from left to right) such that 1z, y 2 , 1y, x 2 [ B.
Lombardi (forthcoming) have studied rational ization of choice functions by a tournament. The first two authors use expansioncontraction axi oms to characterize (necessarily multivalued) choice functions, which are the top cycle of the tournament, where the tournament coincides with the base relation. Lombardi (2006) char acterizes choice functions which are the uncov ered set of the tournament. One can show that sequentially rationalizable choice functions refine the top cycle (of the base relation) in each choice set. In other words, a sequentially ratio nalizable choice function picks an element of the top cycle, so that the choice beats in an arbitrary number of steps any other feasible alternative. X 5 5x, y, w, z6 C g 1w2 5 5wx 6 C g 1x 2 5 5xy, xz, xyz, wxy, wxyz6 C g 1y 2 5 5wy, yz, wyz6
Binary choices are visualized in Figure 2 , where a S b stands for a 5 g 1ab 2. It is straight forward to verify that this choice function sat isfies Expansion, but not Weak WARP (e.g., x 5 g 1X2 and x 5 g 1xz2 but z 5 g 1wxz2 2. This choice function is not an RSM. To see this, sup pose 1w, x 2 [ P . Then x 5 g 1X2 cannot be ratio nalized. Suppose, then, that 1w, x 2 [ P 2 . Then z 5 g 1wxz2 cannot be rationalized, for x will eliminate z regardless of whether 1x, z2 [ P 2 or 1x, z2 [ P . 20 In this notation, the Expansion axiom says that, for all x [ X, C g 1x 2 is closed under set union. Figure 2 Appendix B The task of verifying the 3rationalizability of a given choice function is much more man ageable, even "by hand," that one could fear. We illustrate this with an example. Take the choice function of Example from Appendix A.
Step 1: To construct the family of choice cor respondences on binary sets such that g 1ab 2 [ g * 1ab 2 for all a, b [ X, observe that this require ment restricts g * as follows: for any 5a, b 6, either g * 1ab 2 5 5g 1ab 2 6, or g * 1ab 2 5 5a, b 6. Thus, admissible choice correspondences are given by the resulting combinations. In our example, this would generate 2 6 5 64 choice correspondences on the binary sets to start with.
Step 2: The number of choice correspon dences allowed in Step can be greatly reduced by observing that if a [ g 1S2 for some S which includes a pair 5a, b 6, it must be that a [ g * 1a, b 2 , for otherwise if a is excluded from g * , the latter could never be extended as required in this step. In our example, then, this requires x [ g * 1wx 2 (otherwise x 5 g 1X2 o g * 1X2 2 , and z [ g * 1xz2 (otherwise z 5 g 1wxz2 o g * 1wxz2 2 , so that it must be g * 1wx 2 5 5w, x 6 and g * 1xz2 5 5x, z6, reducing the number of eligible starting choice
The decision maker chooses the median according to B, breaking ties by picking the highest element in the set of median elements. We have z 5 g 1xz2 5 g 1yz2 and yet y 5 g 1xyz2 , violating Always Chosen. The same choice pattern is consistent with the never choose the uniquely largest pro cedure (e.g., a hungry polite guest refrains from picking the largest piece of cake from the tray). Formally, there is again a fundamental order B on alternatives (e.g., size) and the chosen alternative must not be the unique maximizer of B. However, to interpret the choice pattern z 5 g 1xz2 5 g 1yz2 and y 5 g 1xyz2 in this way, the fundamental ordering must be exactly the reverse of the one used for the "choose the median" procedure, namely, 1x, y 2 , 1y, z2 [ B. Nick Baigent and Wulf Gaertner (996) and Gaertner and Yongsheng Xu (999a, b) have axiomatized this type of procedure. correspondences to 2 4 5 6, depending on the behavior of g * in the remaining binary sets.
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As for the extension to nonbinary sets, recall that, according to our algorithm, the extension satisfies a [ g Consequently, it is very easy to extend the domain to nonbinary sets: simply drop from each of these larger sets S any alternative that is rejected by g * in a binary set whose other alternative is in S. It obviously makes sense to start checking whether WWE is satisfied on the choice correspondence that generates the least number of additional sets. We start from the most "parsimonius" g * . Then, take g * 1ab 2 5 5g 1ab 2 6 for all remaining binary sets, i.e., g * 1wy 2 5 5y 6, g * 1wz2 5 5z6, g * 1xy 2 5 5x 6 and g * 1yz2 5 5y 6, so that the most alterna tives are dropped in the extension. For this g * , we derive the following extension: Step 3: WWE holds trivially. We can move to Step 4.
Step 4: With the current choice correspon dence, the algorithm sends us back to Step 2, as g 1g * 1wxz2 2 5 x Z z 5 g 1wxz2. This fail ure, however, alerts us to the fact that we cannot leave z "alone" with x, suggesting that it might make sense to have g * 1wz2 5 5w, z6. With this single modification to our correspondence in
Step 2, the extension changes to 22 Indeed, this is generally true for all choice functions that are sequentially rationalizable. Since any such function satisfies Always Chosen, then: either no choice from a non binary set is "beaten" pairwise by some other alternative in that set, in which case the choice function is rationaliz able in the standard way; or the converse is true, in which case the number of choice correspondences on binary sets is reduced by a factor of at least two, and possibly more. 
